It Is Well Past Lunch

You ever have things to do but you can't get to them becasue something is gnawing away at you like that weird diggy creature Kahn put in Paul Winfields ear? I would've just gone to bed, but I couldn't without posting this. This topic seems to have inspired more back and forth commenting than any other, and some things, I don't like to leave hanging. While I think a better discussion is how peacemaking is more than not fighting, I said in a comment I would post this, so I am.

In the following I am not conceding that invading Iraq was an appropriate intervention at this point nor am I conceding that the rationale, any of the changing rationale, justify the decisions made. What I offer is a response that is too long, and so beautifully written (wink), it shouldn't stay in the comments, but is really a response to a comment.

In contrast to what my posts have been lately, I am going to be brief because a.) longer posts tend to not be read b.) my usual tangential, loose associating style is not appropriate for this. This being this: I am not just attacking the W administration because I hate America and think we should let bad guys kill us all because I hate America so much. I hope that the following will show, that intervention is not a do something or do nothing proposition, that many "somethings" can be done, and in this case the something that is done is done in a way that is worse than it could otherwise be.

We Don't Want the Smoking Gun to Be a Mushroom Cloud
The administration waged an ominous prewar campaign that Iraq was an imminent and dangerous threat that required an immediate preemptive invasion. If that was true, it was the job of the administration to follow the advice of those whose job it is to know how to wage war successfully. This has not been done. If it was not true then... well whatever.

Because we are engaged in a war that has been initiated unnecessarily and unjustly, I would say every person that has died because of it is troubling, but as I said, only for the sake of argument, I will assume we had to invade Iraq. That being the case...

We Will Be Welcomed as Liberators
War architect, Paul Wolfowitz and others, mistakenly assumed that the US would quickly and easily transfer authority to Iraqis because we would be welcomed as liberators. This assumption, in part, led to the belief that fewer rather than more troops would be required. This was a policy decision made in opposition to career Pentagon officials who requested a number close to 400,000 for the invasion who said, based on experience, an immense force was necessary not only for invasion but for stability during occupation. Pentagon officials based this estimate, in part on experience in the Balkans where some NATO/UN forces were in fact viewed as liberators but the realities of war required a large suppressive force in place to prevent an insurgency from developing.

The architects of the Iraq War policy instead thought a small agile force would quickly overwhelm the Iraqi army (which the Pentagon did not doubt) and easily transfer power to the existing Iraqi power structure. The administration did not anticipate resistance therefore they did not commit the necessary forces to prevent the current problem. To say that the Army War College based their recommendations on something other than experience is absurd. Career military leaders requested a force of 400,000. Administration officials denounced those numbers as crazy and said a number closer to 75,000 would be needed. After negotiating, less than 150,000 went. As experienced military predicted, the lower number of forces led to a chaotic occupation that has proved more deadly to occupiers and occupied.

A Rush And a Push
Policy makers decided, in opposition to military leaders, that a quick rush to Baghdad was necessary; Rumsfeld has said that this in fact saved lives. Military officials dispute this. This rush was in line with the administrations picture and promotion of the new type of military policy described above. This assumption is contrary to what US Naval Institute reports and senior Army and Marine Corps officers suggest, that the rush not only bypassed conflicts with those that would build the insurgency but prevented US forces from maintaining a presence that would foster stability. Sending fewer troops than the Pentagon originally wanted and an illusory policy of a blitzkrieg style push to the capital combined to create a worse situation for US forces and Iraqis.

You GoTo War With The Army You Have
Speaking in the third year of an offensive war, Rumsfeld suggested the lack of armor on vehicles and soldiers was a function of logistics. It wasn't because the US was caught off guard, it wasn't because there was a pressing need to go to war, it was because of policy and execution that soldiers and vehicles remained unarmored. At the time he said that, nearly half of the US casualties were caused by IEDs and these casualties, deaths and injuries were made worse by a lack of armor. The administrations lack of preparation led to the deaths of more military.

Pre-war misinformation and misstatements aside, the Bush administration decided to go to war in Iraq in a specific way that has led to the death of a greater number of Coalition forces and Iraqi civilians. If this is among the most brilliantly executed in history, it's a wonder we are a superpower. The picture that emerges is not one of a single mistake that has led to the situation now, rather it is a series of bad choices and unwise moves that has made Iraq a far worse and far deadlier situation to everyone involved. This isn't in comparison with an idealized perfection but a picture of bad policy and execution- moves that would get a CEO (not in a family business) fired, moves that have gotten many people killed.

Even if one is of the mindset that an invasion of Iraq was the only option, the above shows it has not been done well. Even if we don't wonder about motives, we see it was handled poorly. If anyone was committed to an unrealistic idealized version of the world, it is this administration. An administration that has shown itself to be committed to its illusions so much so that 2314 Americans have died and more than 30,000 Iraqis. I am not speaking of the illusions of prewar intelligence and motives. I mean the illusion of a quick entry and suppression that sent young people to kill and be killed against the advice of those who know how to wage war. If you check the links below, it's not a bunch of unshowered, flower wearing hippies saying the administration has been wrong. It is career military people, some of whom have lost their jobs for saying as much.

Here are links to various sources. Some more.

So this doesn't address why I don't think such a military intervention was appropriate in the first place. It doesn't address ways of making peace before war seems an inevitability. (Those discussions are better because so many people imagine pacifism is simply saying, "I won't fight" rather than about working/struggling towards a goal non-violently.) Rather, it's simply against the notion that this invasion is all for the best in this best of worlds.

So much for short.

The words developed and handled were corrected. It was pointed out to me that nothing you say is true if you can't sple.

-Me